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The effect of Financial Reports’ Quality on Firm’s Performance 
 
 
 
Abstract: We analyse whether the quality of firms’ Financial Reports (FRQ) produces any 
effect on their performance. Bradshaw et al. (2004) and Gelos and Wei (2005) call attention to 
the fact that the international capital movements is affected by FRQ. Following Schipper and 
Vicent (2003) we use the abnormal accruals to access earnings quality. For seventeen 
European countries, we found evidence that FRQ produces a positive impact on firm’s 
performance. This finding indicates that mangers are not opportunists and tends to make 
decisions to defend the firm’s best interests. This result is robust since it does not depend on 
the accounting firms’ performance proxy (ROA/ROE). In addition, it is also consistent when 
we use data in time series and in cross-sectional and when we estimate regression with lagged 
or the current year information about abnormal accruals. 
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Introduction 
 
We investigate whether the quality of firms’ Financial Reports (FRQ) affects their accounting 
performance. 
Financial Reports are used by several economic agents in their decisions- making processes. 
Investors decide whether to purchase a firm’s stocks by analysing its financial reports. As 
Fields et al. (2001) wrote accounting reports is needed since the capital market is not efficient 
in a strong way. Even in international capital movements, the financial reports are crucial 
(Bradshow et al. [2004] and Gelos and Wey [2005]). 
Creditors decide to lend or not and they establish contractual conditions, namely interest rates, 
considering accounting numbers, as shown by Gopalakrishan (1994) and Betty and Weber 
(2003).  
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Schipper and Vicent (2003) also emphasised the usefulness of financial reporting and 
underlined that Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Conceptual Framework has 
included it in Concepts Statement no. 1, para.34. 
Therefore, in literature, several methodologies have been developed to investigate earnings 
quality: a) accounting choice followed by Bradshow et al. (2004) and Astami and Tower 
(2006). This consists of creating a ratio from the manager’s accounting choice in a way that 
allows conformity with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to be 
analysed; b) income increasing/ decreasing using a binary dependent variable and a logit 
model as Christy and Zimmerman (1994) and Betty and Weber (2003) did; c) abnormal 
accruals are the residuals from a regression of total accruals depending on investments and 
sales. This methodology was introduced by Jones (1991) and modified Jones by Dechow et al. 
(1995); d) accruals map cash from Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Schipper and Vicent 
(2003). The assumption is that a high quality accrual is eventually realised as cash flow. 
Abnormal Accrual driven from errors in estimation or earning management will not turn into 
cash; e) and finally earnings persistence referred to by Shipper and Vicent (2003) and 
Dermerjian et al. (2006). This approach consists of estimating a regression of earnings as a 
function of past earnings.  
In this work we use abnormal accruals methodology for two reasons: a) data collection 
reasons, since we do not have the accounting choice database and because some countries in 
the sample did not issue cash flows in the period considered; b) abnormal accruals have been 
intensively used for a time which means this methodology is preferable to others. 
Empirical research has been developed to investigate what factors affect firm’s performance. 
As Fields et al. (2001) wrote Financial information quality will be more accurate if we 
understand the managers’ motivations and their influence on firm performance. These authors 
emphasise the importance of regulating managers’ behaviour, but notice the impossibility of 
eliminating the existence of accounting choices. Thus, many studies have been developed and 
there is one consensual question - there are several factors that influence manager behaviour. 
About firms’ performance in capital market, Christie and Zimmerman (1994) stated that an 
accounting choice is efficient when it maximizes firm’s value and this efficiency varies across 
industries and years.  
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Warfield et al. (1995), using the capital market information, analyzed the effects of 
accounting choice on stock returns. They arrived to the evidence that the accounting choices, 
given by abnormal accruals, are inverse related to stock returns.  
This work’s contributions consist of analysing whether FRQ is a relevant factor of firm’ 
performance for a large sample of European countries (seventeen) and industries (forty) and it 
also includes a long period of seventeen years. In addition, we use a fundamental approach 
since the firm’s performance is assessed directly by the Financial Reports and not from 
returns on stock market (technical approach). Finally, we investigate the robustness of our 
results. Therefore we use two accounting proxies for firm’s performance and current year and 
lagged information. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. In the first section, we have the definition of 
the hypotheses to test. We identify the data and methodology used in the empirical work. 
Several statistics are included and the econometric models are defined. In the second section, 
we show the evidence found in the empirical tests, which are then analysed. Some tests are 
done to verify the robustness of the results in order to assure that they are not driven by some 
statistical problems. In the last section, some conclusions are drawn from the results obtained.  
 
Section 1: Methodology, Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we defined the null hypotheses which are going to be tested in section 2. Then 
we have the models used, their variables definitions and signs expected. Finally, some 
statistics are analysed. 
 
1.1. Methodology 
1.1.1. Hypotheses to test 
Warfield et al (1995) found evidence that abnormal accruals produced a negative 
effect on the firm’s stock return, in a way that investors could understand the FRQ and adapt 
their investment strategy. As we use a fundamental methodology we consider an accounting 
indicator of firm’s performance- the ROE. Here, we consider that manager (as the investors) 
also react to FRQ. Firm’s performance increases when the quality of accounting improves 
since managers are efficient as Christie and Zimmerman (1994) found. Managers defend the 
best interests of the firm they represent. Our goal is to clarify whether financial reports’ 
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quality is significant for firm performance or if the effects of other factors are bigger and they 
reduce or eliminated the accounting choice importance. Additionally, if FRQ matter to firm 
performance we examine whether they are positively or negatively related. 
Then we have equation (1): 
)var(321 iablescontrolAAROE itit ααα ++=  
(1) 
The ROA is also used to test if results are not driven by the firm’s performance proxy 
equation (2).  
)var(321 iablescontrolAAAROA itit βββ ++=  
(2) 
We also analyse the lagged effects of AA in ROE (and ROA). This is because managers make 
decisions considering that the information of previous year is more accurate. So we have the 
equations (3) and (4). 
)var(3121 iablescontrolAAAROE itit ααα ++= −  
(3) 
)var(3121 iablescontrolAAAROA itit βββ ++= −  
(4) 
1.1.2. Econometric models, variables definitions and signs expected 
The relation between firm’s performance and accounting information quality is estimated 
using an econometric model, where we have the Abnormal Accruals (AA) and others 
explanatory variables as it is in regression (1): 
itititititit SizeBigDEAAAROE εγλλγγ +++++= 54321 4  
(1) 
Where, 
itROE :  Return on equity (wc08301); 
itAAA : Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals estimated; 
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itSize :  Log of total assets of firm i at year t (total assets-key item- 
wc02999); 
itDE
 
Total debt to common equity (wc08231); 
itBig4
 
Dummy=1 when firm i is audited by one of the biggest and 
international auditing firms at year t and 0 otherwise 
(wc07800); 
itε : 
Error term for firm i at year t. 
This model is also tested with ROA as dependent variable and with the lagged AAA as 
explanatory variable in the second section. 
As in prior research, the Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals (AAA) is a proxy of earnings 
quality [e.g. Larcker and Richardson (2004) and Warfield et al. (1995)], which are estimated 
by total accruals using the cross-sectional modified Jones indicated by Dechow (1995). We 
first computed Total Accrual (TA) by balance sheet approach since some countries do not 
disclose cash flow for all the period considered using equation (5): 
TA = ∆ Rec + ∆ Inv + ∆ OCA - ∆ AP – Dep 
(5) 
Where: 
∆ Rec: Change in receivables (wc02051); 
∆ Inv: Change in inventories (wc02101); 
∆ OCA: Change in other current assets (wc02149); 
∆ AP: Change in accounts payables (wc03040); 
Dep: Depreciation and amortization (wc01151). 
We estimate the regression below (2) to get the Abnormal Accruals (AA) by residuals. For 
time series we have 819 regressions (number of firms considered) with seventeen 
observations (number of years). This approach assumes stationary of parameter estimates.  
For the cross-section, we have 400 regressions (40 industries in a 10-year period). The 
number of observations is different per industry but with a minimum of 9 observations (firms 
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per year). This approach assumes that AA is homogeneous in each industry, as stated by 
Larcker and Richardson (2004). 
The variable AA contains the residuals of that regression i.e. they are the part that is not 
explained by the explanatory variables included (Investment and cash sales): 
 
( ) itit3itit21it uPPE∆Rec∆SalTA ++−+= γγγ  
(2) 
Where: 
itTA  Total Accruals computed by equation (5); 
it∆Sal : Change in sales for firm i between year t and t-1 (wc01001); 
it∆Rec : Change in receivables for firm i between year t and t-1 
(wc02051); 
itPPE : Property, plant and equipment- gross for firm i at year t 
(wc02301); 
itu : Error term for firm i at year t. 
  
Therefore, in this model it is assumed that changes in revenues less changes in receivables, as 
well as capital intensity create normal accruals. The credit sales are supposed to be abnormal. 
All variables are scaled by mean of total assets in the end of the current year and in the end of 
the previous year. This is to reduce heteroskedasticity problems since the sample includes 
firms with very different sizes. 
Nevertheless the improvements, accruals are still incomplete since subsists imprecision 
associated to classification of normal and abnormal accruals as Phillips et al. (2003), Larcker 
and Richardson (2004) wrote. Several developments introduce more variables into Total 
Accruals regression to explain the accruals that emerge from the normal activity of firms such 
as cash flow and return on assets. However, the model suggested by Dechow (1995) is still 
the most accurate. 
An important issue is that the abnormal accruals are analysed by their absolute value. We don’t 
aim to analyse abnormal accruals sign (positive or negative) but its total amount. The highest 
absolute value of AA is the less quality Financial Information has. 
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We included other explanatory variables that are expected to affect firm performance: 
Size is the logarithm of a firm’s total assets of on year t. The sign expect is positive since the 
bigger is the firm the better is its performance as stated by Bradshow et al. (2004) Betty and 
Weber (2002), Mitton (2002), DeFond et al (1997); 
DE, capital structure given by the ratio debt to assets, the expected sign is positive since high 
leverage means high risk and so higher cost with creditors and shareholders ask for more 
return as referred by Bradshow et al. (2004), Warfield et al. (1995) and Christie and 
Zimmerman (1994). In addition, managers aim to avoid bad credit covenants [Betty and 
Weber (2002) and Gopalakrishnan (1994)]; 
Finally, the third control variable is Big4 which is expected to be positively related with 
firm’s performance, since a firm audited by one of the biggest international audit firm will 
present more accurate accounting information since firm must report all the earnings as stated 
by Bradshow et al. (2004) and Mitton (2002). 
For all countries, these variables were in Euros. Therefore we could not use local currency for 
five countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
 
1.2. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
1.2.1. Sample 
We collect accounting data from Worldscope for seventeen European Countries. In the 
empirical work we use data in time series and in cross-sectional. This situation drives us to 
have two limits in our sample:  
1. Data in time series consists of 819 firms. In lagged AA we made regression 
estimations with a total of 13,104 firm-years observations, corresponding to a 
period of sixteen years which is from 1990 to 2005. Regressing with current AA 
we have13,923 firms/years observations, a seventeen years period (from 1990 to 
2006);  
2. Data in cross-sectional has 1,406 firms. In lagged AA we made regression 
estimations with a total of 12,654 firm-years observations with a nine-year period, 
from 1997 to 2006. Regressing with current AA we have 14,060 firms/years 
observation, a ten years period (from 1990 to 2006). 
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In both cases, we only consider firms that have accounting information available in 
Worldscope for all years considered. This condition was imposed just to compute the 
abnormal accruals, our proxy for FRQ. 
Nevertheless, for the determinants estimations, some accounting data may miss but we use 
unbalanced panel technique. This gives us 825 and 1,490 firms with 14,025 and 14,900 firms-
years observations respectively. 
However, firms with SIC code 6000 to 6999 were excluded since Financial Institutions have 
specific regulations. It reduces the sample to 819 and 1,477 firms in time series and cross-
sectional, respectively.  
In addition, for data in cross-section, we also have to exclude firms in industries with fewer 
than 9 firms. This a condition to estimate the determinants model since we have 8 explanatory 
variables. This restriction reduces our sample in 19 firms. In the end, we made cross-sectional 
analysis with 1,406 firms and 40 industries.  
1.2.2. Descriptive statistics  
The sample we collect presents a heterogeneous structure, since the number of firms of each 
country varies considerably. 
In the time series sample, the United Kingdom (UK) shows the highest number of firms 294 
which is nearly 36% of the total sample.  
The second and third most represented countries are Germany and France. Together they have 
close to 30% of the total firms considered.  
A third more representative group is constituted by Italy which firms represent 6.3%, 
followed by Netherland with 5.1% and by Sweden, which have near 5% of the firms. Spain is 
the next country with more firms included in the sample with almost 4%. 
All other countries have less than 5%. There several countries between 1% and 2%, that is the 
case of Belgium with 1.3%, Greece with 1.1%, Norway represents 1.3%, Portugal having 1% 
of the firms, and Ireland with 2%. These five countries represent just 7% of the sample. 
The last representative country is Luxembourg with just one firm in the sample, followed by 
Finland with two firms and Austria with four. These are the countries with the smallest 
number of firms and together they have less than 1% of the sample. 
This information is presented in table 1. 
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Table 1: Number of firms per country in the time series sample 
Country No. of firms  
(A) 
Observations 
(B)=A*16 years 
 
(C)=(A)/819 
Austria 4 64 0.5% 
Belgium 11 176 1.3% 
Denmark 33 528 4.0% 
Finland 2 32 0.2% 
France 125 2000 15.3% 
Germany 118 1888 14.4% 
Greece 9 144 1.1% 
Ireland 16 256 2.0% 
Italy 52 832 6.3% 
Luxembourg 1 16 0.1% 
Netherlands 42 672 5.1% 
Norway 11 176 1.3% 
Portugal 8 128 1.0% 
Spain 30 480 3.7% 
Sweden 40 640 4.9% 
Switzerland 23 368 2.8% 
UK 294 4704 35.9% 
Total 819 13104 100.0% 
 
For all the period considered and from table 2, we see that, in time series approach, 643 firms 
were audited by one of the biggest auditing company which represent almost 79% of the total 
sample. This number has a dramatic decrease in terms of ADR: only 116 firms of 819 (14%) 
issued ADR list. 
In the cross-sectional approach, there is a slight decrease in Big4 and the relative number of 
firms with ADR is constant: 76% of firms in our sample had auditory made by one of Big4 
and 14% have ADR list (196 in 1406 firms).  
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UK is the country with the highest percentage of ADR list and Big4: almost 28% have ADR 
list and 35% are audited by a Big4 in the time series and 32% have ADR list and a Big4 
company in cross-sectional approach. These percentages have correspondence with the 
relative number of UK firms in the total sample (see tables 1 and 2). 
Ireland exhibits a strong protection to investors (one of the two countries with common law) 
because 31% and 26% of the firms has got ADR list (time series and cross-sectional, 
respectively). More than 93% and 86% of the firms are audited by one of Big4 (15 in 16 in 
time series and 19 in 22 firms in cross-sectional approach 
Norway is close to Ireland with 28% of the firms with an ADR list. Norway also has a huge 
percentage of firms audited by one of the Big4 with 93% and 96%.  
France percentages of ADR and Big4 are smaller than the percentage of firms in the total 
sample. This situation is worse in the cross-sectional approach. These numbers confirms that 
code law protects less the investors than the other legal origins. 
Countries as Portugal, Greece and Spain have just six percent of the firms with ADR list in 
the cross-sectional approach (the situation is worse in the time series where Portugal and 
Greece do not have any form with ADR list) and about half of firms are not audit by one of 
the four biggest auditing firms. Once again these converge to La Porta et al. (1998) since 
these countries have code/French law origin. 
In Luxembourg, half of firm had ADR list and all were audited by one of BIG4. Those are the 
highest percent of firms with ADR list and audited by one of BIG4. However, just four firms 
from this country were included on the sample given the restrictions explained above.  
Table 2: Countries corporate governance characteristics 
Countries Time series     Cross-section     Law/ Origin 
  ADR % ADR Big4 % Big4 ADR % ADR Big4 % Big4   
Austria  2 1.72 4 0.62 7 3.57 18 1.69 Code/German 
Belgium  1 0.86 11 1.71 2 1.02 24 2.25 Code/French 
Denmark  2 1.72 27 4.20 3 1.53 42 3.93 Code/ Scandinavian 
Finland  2 1.72 2 0.31 6 3.06 42 3.93 Code/ Scandinavian 
France  16 13.79 94 14.62 20 10.20 91 8.52 Code/French 
Germany  14 12.07 64 9.95 25 12.76 130 12.17 Code/German 
Greece  0 0.00 5 0.78 2 1.02 19 1.78 Code/French 
Ireland  5 4.31 15 2.33 5 2.55 19 1.78 Common/English 
Italy  11 9.48 52 8.09 13 6.63 69 6.46 Code/French 
Luxembourg  0 0.00 1 0.16 2 1.02 4 0.37 Code/French 
Netherlands  9 7.76 39 6.07 19 9.69 65 6.09 Code/French 
Norway  2 1.72 11 1.71 5 2.55 22 2.06 Code/ Scandinavian 
Portugal  0 0.00 4 0.62 3 1.53 7 0.66 Code/French 
Spain  3 2.59 28 4.35 3 1.53 28 2.62 Code/French 
Sweden  14 12.07 40 6.22 14 7.14 64 5.99 Code/ Scandinavian 
Swiss 3 2.59 23 3.58 4 2.04 82 7.68 Code/German 
UK 32 27.59 223 34.68 63 32.14 342 32.02 Common/English 
Total 116 100.00 643 100.00 196 100.00 1068 100.00   
                                               
 
In the cross-sectional sample, the UK still has the highest number of firms with close to 31%. 
This country has firms in all industries considered, except in two-digits SIC code no. 16 
(Building- Heavy).  
France and Germany are again the second and third most represented countries. They also 
decrease their importance in the total sample when we compare with the time series sample. 
Together they represent 26%.  
The least represented is still Luxembourg but it has a slight increase: from one to four firms. 
Portugal is the second country with fewer firms with less than 1% of total sample firms (13 
firms). Switzerland, Austria, Finland and Belgium increase their importance in the cross-
sectional sample: these four countries have less than 5% of the sample in time series data and 
increase to almost 15% in the cross-sectional data. 
The number of firms fixed on countries from code law origin is bigger than the number of 
firms from common law (68% from the 17 countries considered less UK and Ireland). In 
accordance with LaPorta et al. (2000), our sample has more firms with less investor 
protection. 
The industry with the most number of firms is SIC code 35 (Industrial) with 6.7% of total. 
But there are several industries around 6% as SIC code 73 (Business Services), 28 
(Chemicals) and 20 (Food). The industries with the fewest firms are SIC code 29 (Petroleum), 
with the minimum to be considered (nine firms) and SIC code 39 (Manufacturing), with 10 
firms.  
The composition of our sample by countries and industries is contained in table 3. 
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Table 3: Number of firms per country and industries in cross- sectional sample  
SIC2 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxemb. NL Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Swiss UK Total 
Industry 
% of 
total 
13 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 9 16 1.1 
15 5 1 1 2 3 3 0 2 0 0 2 0 3 0 1 0 20 43 3.1 
16 0 0 2 0 4 3 5 3 0 0 3 0 0 7 1 0 0 28 2.0 
17 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 7 15 1.1 
20 4 7 5 6 15 12 5 4 0 2 6 0 1 2 1 7 15 92 6.5 
22 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 23 1.6 
23 0 0 0 2 1 9 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 19 1.4 
25 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 11 0.8 
26 2 0 1 9 2 2 0 0 3 0 1 2 2 1 6 1 3 35 2.5 
27 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 2 6 0 5 2 0 0 1 3 12 36 2.6 
28 1 2 5 1 13 19 2 1 5 0 4 0 0 2 0 6 31 92 6.5 
29 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 9 0.6 
30 1 4 0 2 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6 22 1.6 
32 4 0 5 0 5 13 2 3 4 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 11 53 3.8 
33 2 3 0 1 2 1 6 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 1 5 8 37 2.6 
34 0 0 0 3 6 2 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 3 4 13 37 2.6 
35 0 1 1 4 8 26 1 0 3 0 4 2 0 0 9 16 19 94 6.7 
36 1 2 3 4 14 14 0 0 5 0 3 1 0 2 4 7 24 84 6.0 
37 1 2 0 0 8 12 0 0 11 0 1 0 0 3 7 1 9 55 3.9 
38 0 0 2 1 5 5 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 3 6 19 48 3.4 
39 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 12 0.9 
42 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 0.7 
44 0 1 1 3 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 4 18 1.3 
45 2 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 14 1.0 
47 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 15 1.1 
48 0 2 1 0 6 1 1 0 4 1 2 0 1 2 4 2 7 34 2.4 
49 2 2 0 2 7 6 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 5 0 5 14 49 3.5 
50 0 1 6 3 11 7 5 1 0 0 5 1 0 2 5 6 27 80 5.7 
51 2 1 3 1 14 15 3 2 1 0 2 2 0 3 0 4 6 59 4.2 
53 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 12 0.9 
54 0 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 1 3 16 1.1 
55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 5 10 0.7 
56 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 8 14 1.0 
58 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 15 1.1 
59 0 1 0 0 3 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 16 1.1 
70 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 7 18 1.3 
73 0 1 2 0 9 7 1 0 3 0 6 1 0 1 9 6 46 92 6.5 
79 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 8 17 1.2 
80 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 11 0.8 
87 0 0 4 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 2 0 29 45 3.2 
Total 
Country 30 33 49 53 181 184 41 22 76 4 68 23 13 44 66 92 427 1406 100.0 
% of total 2.1 2.3 3.5 3.8 12.9 13.1 2.9 1.6 5.4 0.3 4.8 1.6 0.9 3.1 4.7 6.5 30.4 100   
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In table 4, we can see the two-digit SIC code industries and the mean absolute 
value of AA per industry (AAA). SIC code 15 (Buildings- Light) has the highest 
average amount of AA in the averaged total assets, over 8.4%. This industry 
represents just 3% of the total sample. 
The three most represented industries (SIC code 35- Industrial, SIC code 36-
Electrical and 73- Business Services) have high levels of AAA (Absolute 
Abnormal Value of Accruals), with close to 6.7%, 6.6% and 8% of total assets 
respectively, in mean. In other words, taking table 3 and 4 we can see that the 
industries with more number of firms exhibit high levels of AAA.  
If we add these four industries we have more than 21% of sample with AAA 
above the sample average, as we can see in table 5. Besides, more than half of 
the industries considered (21 of 40) have levels of AAA bigger than the sample 
average. 
The industries with the fewest AA are water air transport (SIC code 44 and 45) 
with about 2% each one (table4). These industries are not very representative 
since they represent less than 1% of the sample each one, as we can see in tables 
3 and 4. 
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Table 4: Industry denomination and each absolute value of Abnormal 
Accruals 
SIC2 Industry AAA 
13 Oil & Gas 0.048364655 
15 Building- Light 0.084022459 
16 Building- Heavy 0.074996399 
17 Construction 0.053132166 
20 Food 0.049722951 
22 Textile mill 0.041374786 
23 Apparel 0.049965843 
25 Furniture 0.061007529 
26 Paper 0.03154976 
27 Printing 0.033504601 
28 Chemicals 0.045037408 
29 Petroleum 0.022230844 
30 Rubber 0.037141488 
32 Stone 0.042937747 
33 Metal Work- Basic 0.049609058 
34 Metal Work- Fabrication 0.039247411 
35 Industrial 0.066969671 
36 Electrical 0.065500408 
37 Transport Equipment 0.049874877 
38 Instruments 0.04653678 
39 Misc. Manufacturing 0.049078812 
42 Motor Freight 0.040155187 
44 Water Transport 0.027941279 
45 Air Transport 0.022271353 
47 Transport Services 0.050448316 
48 Communications 0.050084184 
49 Utilities 0.033087356 
50 Durables- Wholesale 0.062722744 
51 Non Durables- Wholesale 0.053159494 
53 General Stores 0.029425799 
54 Food Stores 0.025833165 
55 Auto Dealers 0.049041197 
56 Apparel Retail 0.054097932 
58 Eating 0.023159576 
59 Misc. Retail 0.045700191 
70 Hotels 0.037618876 
73 Business Services 0.079249074 
79 Amusement & Recreation Services 0.048993939 
80 Health Services 0.04029709 
87 
Engineering, Accounting & Management 
Services 0.07194476 
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Considering the time series approach, and as expected, the mean of the AA is 
close to zero with -0.0006. As we use the absolute value of AA (AAA) it 
represents 4.75% of the averaged total assets, as we can see in table 4. The mean 
of firms’ size is about €374,000.00. On average, ROA is 5.13%. In mean, total 
debt is 80% of common equity. The highest standard deviation can be seen in 
debt to equity. This can indicate that there are some highly leveraged firms and 
others that are not. Moreover, there are some firms with a negative equity (see 
table 5). 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics in the times series approach 
  AA AAA Size ROA DE 
 Mean -0.0006 0.0475 12.8333 5.1288 80.5757 
 Median 0.0005 0.0306 12.7204 5.4900 50.4100 
 Maximum 0.8072 1.0951 19.4289 501.2800 29869.4300 
 Minimum -1.0951 0 4.5539 -1006.4300 -93200.0000 
 Std. Dev. 0.0746 0.0576 2.0977 15.3912 1101.1480 
Obs. 13,104 13,104 12,880 13,045 13,060 
Variables definitions: AAA is the absolute value of AA and this is abnormal accruals and 
consists of residuals of regression estimation: ( ) i321i uPPEαes∆receivabl∆salesααTA ++−+= . TA is 
Total Accruals and is obtained by changes in receivables (wc02051) plus change in inventories 
(wc02101) and change in other current assets (wc02149) less changes in accounts payables 
(wc03040) and less depreciation (wc01151). All variables from this model are scaled by the 
average of total assets (wc02999). Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (wc02999). ROA is 
returns on assets (wc08326). Finally, DE is Debt to Equity and is defined as total debt to 
common equity (wc08231). 
 
Changing the approach to cross-sectional makes no considerable differences in 
the sample structure. The mean of AAA is higher in almost half percent point 
and it is 5.24% of the average total assets. The mean firms’ size increases to 
about €520,528.00. In mean, the firms included in the cross-sectional approach 
have more ROA which is 5.88%. The debt to equity ratio decreases when 
compared with the time series data. However, standard deviation is not only high 
but increased. This means that the differences in capital structure in the firms 
included get bigger (see table6). 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics in the cross-sectional approach 
  AA AAA Size ROA DE 
 Mean 0.0000 0.0524 13.1626 5.8814 72.1958 
 Median 0.0007 0.0337 12.9674 5.9000 55.5700 
Maximum 0.9291 0.9877 19.4289 996.2900 37501.9200 
Minimum -0.9877 0.0000 4.5539 -1251.1800 -93200.0000 
 Std. Dev. 0.0820 0.0631 2.0056 29.3649 1492.8010 
Obs. 12,654 12,654 12,456 12598 12,651 
Variables definitions are in table 5. 
 
About the correlation between variables, in the time series data we can see that 
the correlation between the proxy of firm’s performance ROA and the FRQ 
proxy (AAA) is the highest with negative correlation of 13.5%. Size is the 
explanatory variable with the second highest correlation with ROA 8.4%, 
followed by Big4 with 5.5%. The weakest correlation is between DE ration and 
ROA with less than 1%. 
The correlations between the independent variables are not strong, except that 
between Size and Big4, with almost 35%. Thus, they do not cause any problem 
in the estimation of the regressions. See panel A of table 7. 
When we use the lagged AAA, all the previous correlation get a little stronger. 
Specially, the correlation between ROA and AAA (from -13.5% to -18.7%). See 
panel B of table 7. 
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Table 7: Correlations between firm’s performance and the independent 
variables in the time series approach 
Panel A: Correlations using ROA and AAA 
ROA Size DE Big4 AAA 
ROA 1.0000 
Size 0.0835 1.0000 
DE -0.0040 0.0389 1.0000 
  Big4 0.0540 0.3480 0.0058 1.0000 
AAA -0.1351 -0.2208 0.0088 -0.1026 1.0000 
Panel B: Correlations using ROA and lagged AAA 
ROA 1.0000 
Size 0.0921 1.0000 
   DE -0.0042 0.0380 1.0000 
Big4 0.0556 0.3506 0.0051 1.0000 
 AAA -0.1871 -0.2212 0.0096 -0.1012 1.0000 
Variables definitions are in table 5. Big4 is a dummy and is one if auditing firm is one of the four 
biggest international companies and zero otherwise (wc07800); Law is a dummy which is one if 
the country’s legal origin is Common law and zero otherwise. 
 
When we use the ROE as firm’s performance proxy, the correlation between 
ROE and AAA decreases. From a correlation of -13.5% to a correlation of -5%. 
Other considerable change is between DE and ROE which turns stronger. It was 
less than 1% with ROA and get almost 14% with ROE. This is because ROE 
includes net income (financial component of earnings) and ROA just includes 
EBIT (Earnings before interest and taxes). 
The other correlations don’t change much and again the emphasis to the 
correlation between Size and Big 4 with near 35%. See panel A of table 8. 
Considering the lagged AAA, all correlations get a little stronger. The exception 
is between ROE and AAA since it decreases form -5.0% to -3.3%. See panel B 
of table 8. 
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Table 8: Correlations between firm’s performance and the independent 
variables in the time series approach 
Panel A: Correlations using ROE and AAA 
ROE Size DE Big4 AAA 
ROE 1.0000 
Size 0.0540 1.0000 
DE 0.1394 0.0377 1.0000 
  Big4 0.0580 0.3425 0.0053 1.0000 
AAA -0.0504 -0.2026 0.0175 -0.0995 1.0000 
Panel B: Correlations using ROE and lagged AAA 
ROE 1.0000 
Size 0.0545 1.0000 
   DE 0.1409 0.0373 1.0000 
Big4 0.0606 0.3449 0.0048 1.0000 
 AAA -0.0230 -0.1986 0.0118 -0.0955 1.0000 
Variables definitions are in table 5and 7. 
Considering the cross sectional approach, the differences are slight: a small 
decrease between ROA and AAA (from -13.5% to almost -11%); and an 
increase of ROA and size (8.4% to 15.1%). The correlation between ROA and 
DE ratio is still very small, again under 1%. The correlation between Size and 
big4 also decreased a little form 35% to 27%. See panel A table 9. 
About the correlation using lagged AAA, there are almost no changes as we can 
see on panel B of table 9. 
Table 9: Correlations between firm’s performance and the independent 
variables in the cross-sectional approach 
Panel A: Correlations using ROA and AAA 
ROA  Size DE Big4  AAA 
ROA 1.0000 
    Size 0.1512 1.0000 
   DE -0.0014 0.0178 1.0000 
Big4 0.0776 0.2656 0.0011 1.0000 
AAA -0.1082 -0.1743 0.0061 -0.0757 1.0000 
Panel B: Correlations using ROA and lagged AAA 
ROA 1.0000 
Size 0.1603 1.0000 
   DE -0.0008 0.0160 1.0000 
Big4 0.0769 0.2674 0.0003 1.0000 
AAA -0.1015 -0.1728 0.0090 -0.0738 1.0000 
Variables definitions are in table 5and 7. 
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As in the time series approach, the correlation between ROE and AAA is smaller 
than ROA and AAA. The correlation between ROE and Size is smaller than 
ROA and size. And the correlation between ROE and DE ration is bigger than 
ROA DE ratio. See panel A of table 10. 
Considering the lagged AAA the differences are too small, just the relation 
between ROE and AAA get a little weak (from a negative 3.6% to a negative 
1.3%). See panel B of table 10. 
Table 10: Correlations between firm’s performance and the independent 
variables in the cross-sectional approach 
Panel A: Correlations using ROE and AAA 
ROE  Size DE Big4  AAA 
ROE 1.0000 
Size 0.0562 1.0000 
   DE 0.1199 0.0300 1.0000 
Big4 0.0436 0.2573 -0.0019 1.0000 
AAA -0.0364 -0.1683 0.0026 -0.0769 1.0000 
Panel B: Correlations using ROE and lagged AAA 
ROE 1.0000 
Size 0.0588 1.0000 
   DE 0.1232 0.0284 1.0000 
Big4 0.0434 0.2580 -0.0025 1.0000 
AAA -0.0132 -0.1600 0.0074 -0.0699 1.0000 
Variables definitions are in table 5and 7. 
 
Section 2: Empirical results 
In the firms’ performance models estimations, we use unbalanced data panel. 
This enables us to obtain coefficients estimations that consider differences by 
including several years and firms.  
Data panel is unbalanced because some variables do not have values in certain 
years. This technique substitutes the missing variables and increases the 
efficiency of estimated coefficients (Soares and Stark, 2008). 
Panel data is estimated with period fixed effects, i.e. with dummy variables for 
years. When we introduce the dummy to BIG4 we can have just period fixed 
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effect because it produces the problem of a singular matrix with the panel 
technique to firms.  
From the results we obtained, we can see that the adjusted R squared is always at 
law levels but it is bigger in ROA estimative of firm performance in all 
estimations than in ROE:  
For time series data, we have a small difference (ROA with 0.0287 and ROE 
with 0.0273) in contemporaneous analysis. The difference is more expressive in 
lag analysis (0.0444 and 0.0263 respectively).  
For cross-sectional data, we have in ROA an adjusted R-squared with about 
0.042 and ROE with about 0.021.These numbers are observable from table 11 to 
14. 
About the estimative of AAA, we found evidence that AAA is always 
statistically significant to explain the dependent variable (tables 11, 13 and 14) at 
1% level. The only except is when we consider ROE and the lagged AAA, both 
in cross-sectional and in time series approach.  
The sign of AAA estimative is negative in all tests which are in accordance with 
the predicted sign: when we have more abnormal accruals, this means worse 
financial information, the firm performance is lower because managers are 
efficient. Notice that AAA is an inverse estimative of Financial Report Quality. 
Then, more AAA means less FRQ. 
All control variables are statistically significant at 1% level and their signs are in 
accordance with the expected. The only exception is DE which is not statistically 
significant and with the opposite sign from expected for ROA proxy of firm’s 
performance in both the time series and cross-sectional approaches and with 
current or lag methodology for FRQ proxy (tables 11 to 14). 
Focusing in table 11, we can see that all explanatory variables included are 
statistically significant at 1% level, both in the time series and the cross-sectional 
approach. 
In addition, all the estimative signs are in accordance with the predicted sign: 
Size produces a positive effect on firms’ performance, meaning that when size 
increase firms exhibit better financial information; DE affects positively ROE 
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because when firms’ debt increases the managers make accounting decisions to 
increase firms’ performance; Finally Big4 is positively related with ROE since 
the international auditing firms have an effective monitoring effect and all 
earnings are reported. 
Table 11: H0- Impact of FRQ (AAA) on firm’s performance (ROE)  
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) (OLS t-statistic) 
    Time series   Cross-sectional   
Intercept -7.8432 * -19.8087 * 
-1.7737 -3.6419 
Size + 0.9279 * 1.8898 * 
2.6694 4.6184 
DE + 0.0105 * 0.0099 * 
16.1996 13.8926 
Big4 + 8.3388 * 6.6200 * 
4.8843 3.5225 
AAA - -60.7904 * -42.6908 * 
  
  -4.9300   -3.3439   
Number of Obs. 13,405 13,539 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0273   0.0210   
Variables definitions are in table 11. 
*correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
In table 12, we see that AAA does not have a statistical significant impact on 
ROE. This is the only exception.  
AAA sign is always negative and it is in accordance to the expected. In other 
words, when we consider the AAA in the current year or in the year before the 
relation with ROE does not change: when AAA increases the ROE decreases, 
meaning that managers are not opportunists.  
About the control variables included, all variables are statistically significant and 
produce a positive effect on ROE both in the time series and in cross-sectional 
approach (table 12). Therefore, we can say that the lagged AAA methodology 
does not affect the relations between those set of variables and ROE 
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Table 12: H04- Impact of FRQ (lagged AAA) on firm’s performance (ROE) 
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) (OLS t-statistic) 
    Time series   Cross sectional   
Intercept -13.0427 * -26.8922 * 
-2.8032 -4.5396 
Size + 1.1059 * 2.2309 * 
3.0297 5.0178 
DE + 0.0104 * 0.0100 * 
15.7899 13.5326 
Big4 + 9.2917 * 6.9100 * 
5.1762 3.3720 
Lagged AAA - -18.7647 -6.2960 
  
  -1.4386   -0.4486   
Number of Obs. 12,611 12,180 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0263   0.0210   
Variables definitions are in table 11. 
*correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
When we consider ROA as a proxy of firm’s performance, the FRQ proxy is still 
statistically significant, at a 1% level, to explain the dependent variable in the 
time series and cross-sectional.  
The sign is again negative, as expected, since poor financial report quality 
(higher AAA) means a decrease in ROA (table 13). 
As control variables are concerned, we have a considerable difference from the 
results obtained for the ROE proxy of firm’s performance: the DE ratio becomes 
no significant and with opposite (negative) sign from expected. For the other two 
explanatory variables results are consistent both in ROE and in ROA. Therefore, 
Size and Big4 still produce a positive and statistically significant impact on 
ROA, at 1% level (see table 13). 
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Table 13: H04- Impact of FRQ (AAA) on firm’s performance (ROA) 
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) (OLS t-statistic) 
 
  
  Time series   Cross-sectional   
Intercept 0.8170 -6.3482 * 
0.9448 -8.4977 
Size + 0.4148 * 0.8446 * 
6.0899 14.9850 
DE + -9.28E-05 -3.79E-05 
-0.7753 -0.5040 
Big4 + 0.8091 * 1.0925 * 
2.4053 4.1834 
AAA - -32.7194 * -17.8527 * 
    -14.0790   -10.2224   
Number of Obs. 13,665 13,823 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0287   0.0430   
Variables definitions are in table 11. 
*correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
With the lagged methodology, the relations of independent variables and ROA 
do not change in a considerable way: the FRQ proxy is statistically significant at 
1% level in the time series and cross-sectional approaches and its sign is 
negative as predicted since whether FRQ decrease in the previous year (the 
AAA of t-1 increases) the current firm’s performance decreases (table 14). 
The explanatory variables Size and Big4 produce the same impact on ROA as in 
ROE and in current or lagged methodology: when these variables increase the 
ROA also increase. In other words, if these explanatory variables decrease ROA 
also decreases. In contrast, with ROA the DE ratio remains positive. This is the 
opposite sign from expected and it is not statistically significant (see table 14). 
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Table 14: H04- Impact of FRQ (lagged AAA) on firm’s performance (ROA) 
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) (OLS t-statistic) 
    Time series   Cross-sectional   
Intercept 1.7204 * -7.5203 * 
(1.8985) (-9.4285) 
Size + 0.3900 * 0.9124 * 
(5.4747) (15.2022) 
DE + -8.11E-05 -2.97E-05 
(-0.6665) (-0.3879) 
Big4 + 0.7578 * 1.0337 * 
(2.1513) (3.7063) 
Lagged AAA - -47.0256 * -15.5470 * 
    (-19.4937)   (-8.3875)   
Number of Obs. 12,861 12,439 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0430   0.0419   
Variables definitions are in table 11. 
*correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
     
Section 3: Conclusions 
 
We found evidence that FRQ produces a positive impact on firm’s performance 
at European countries. Therefore, the current firm’s performance (ROA or ROE) 
increases when FRQ increases both in current and in lagged AAA methodology. 
In addition, more then half of industries have levels of AAA above the sample 
average. 
This two evidences means that the performance of firms tends to be adjusted in 
accordance with the quality of Financial Reports. Higher performances are 
exhibit when the quality of financial information improves. Moreover this 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that mangers are efficient and not 
opportunists. Although, managers have incentives to decrease firm’s 
performance since the FRQ increases they tend to make decisions to defend the 
firm’s best interests. 
This result is robust since it was obtained for the times series and the cross-
sectional approach. In addition, the results remain the same when we consider 
the current FRQ or the FRQ of previous year. The only exception appears with 
the ROE proxy of firm’s performance in the lag methodology, where AAA 
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becomes no significant but still producing a negative impact on firm’s 
performance. 
About the control factors of firm’s performance, the results obtained shows that 
size and auditing company are relevant factors and they produce a positive 
impact on firm’s performance. In other words, huge firm’s and audited by one of 
the biggest international auditing firms, exhibits the best performances. These 
results were obtained in all tests.  
About capital structure it is not consistent when we use ROE or ROA. Therefore, 
with ROE it produces the expected effect on firm’s performance because when 
DE ratio increases the ROE also increase. This is due to avoid debt constrains. In 
contrast when we use ROA the sign turns negative meaning that a big DE ratio 
affects negatively the ROA. 
A development to this work could be using another proxy for FRQ such as the 
accounting choice as used by Bradshaw et al. 
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